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SHOULD CITIZENS OF A WELFARE
STATE BE TRANSFORMED INTO
“QUEENS”? A RESPONSE TO RISSE
JULIAN LE GRAND
London School of Economics
Mathias Risse has provided a thoughtful critique of my book, raising
serious points about a major part of the argument. I am glad to have
the opportunity to reﬂect further on it.
The book contends that policy should be designed both to reﬂect
the fact that the people who provide public services such as education
or health care are a combination of knaves (self-interested egoists) and
knights (other-directed altruists), and to treat users of those services, not
as passive victims of services (pawns), but instead as powerful consumers
(queens). It discusses various ways in which this might be done including
the use of quasi-markets in service delivery (where tax funds are used to
equalize everyone’s purchasing power for, say, education and health care,
but provision is left to a competitive market), and more direct ways of
empowering citizens, such as a demogrant (a universal grant of capital to
everyone on attaining the age of majority).
Risse seems happy with the book’s arguments concerning the essen-
tially empirical propositions relating to knights and knaves, and indeed
supports many of the policy ideas. He reserves his principal criticisms
for the philosophical justiﬁcations that I put forward for my normative
position that service users ought to be turned from pawns to queens.
In the book, I contend that the case for turning pawns to queens
can be made from any of three perspectives: liberal, welfarist, and
communitarian. Risse argues that from each of these perspectives the
argument is “weaker than [Le Grand] thinks.” First, the liberals. Risse
divides these into two – libertarians of a Nozickian kind and liberal
egalitarians of a Rawlsian kind – and claims that neither would support
myposition. This is primarily because I setmy arguments for transforming
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service users from pawns into queens within the context of a universalist
welfare state. That is, I assume that the service whose users are to be
empowered –whose pawns are to be transformed into queens – is ﬁnanced
from some form of redistributive taxation, and that the purchasing power
for the service concerned is equalized before the market or quasi-market
is allowed to let rip. Risse argues a true libertarian would stop well before
this, on the grounds that redistributive taxation has no place in any scheme
really designed to promote people’s freedomof action. In contrast, a liberal
egalitarian would accept the need for redistributive taxation, but, in doing
so, would acknowledge that the coercive element essential to such taxation
must imply that people are being treated to some extent as pawns. Hence
she too would not advocate pawns being turned completely into queens.
At a later stage in his review, Risse returns to this libertarian/liberal
egalitarian divide, arguing that an American reader, likely to be more
subject to libertarian intuitions, would ﬁnd it odd that I push for the
empowerment of users but do not question the redistributivewelfare state,
while a European one would ﬁnd it peculiar that, while both she and
I would accept the legitimacy of limiting (some) individuals’ freedoms
through redistribution, I can still argue for users to be queens. Risse says
that “it is hard to have it both ways.”
I would not presume to argue with a philosopher as to the way that
different schools of thought might react to my arguments, and I accept
the implied rebuke that my ascription of the label “liberal” to what are
actually two very different positions was simplistic. But I will not accept
that my own position is in some way inconsistent. For my argument
simply represents a trade-off between different values, none of which
has lexicographic priority over another. I am not a pure libertarian, in the
sense that I consider policies designed to promote liberty or freedom of
action always and in every context dominate other concerns such as equity
or social justice. Redistributive taxation and the equalization of people’s
ability to obtain health care and education is thus perfectly acceptable –
and indeed desirable. On the other hand, I am not a pure egalitarian (or,
perhapsmore accurately, equitarian) in the sense that I consider concerns of
equity or social justice should always dominate every other consideration.
So a complete curb on everyone’s freedom of action in the name of equity
is not acceptable. Since to achieve “full” equity and “complete” liberty
simultaneously is probably impossible, the aim is to ﬁnd a policy solution
that achieves an acceptable measure of both equity and liberty, while
accepting that neither objective is likely to be completely satisﬁed. And
using the revenue from redistributive taxation to move towards greater
equality of capital ownership (as with the demogrant), or to equalize
purchasing power in health care and education (as with quasi-market
systems of service delivery) seems to be an illustration of just such an
acceptable balance.
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Of course, the problem with that position for political philosophy is
that it does not really explain why this balance is acceptable but another is
not. Ideally therewouldbe an evenmore fundamental principle thatwould
determine the point of an acceptable trade-off between liberty and equity,
but the search for such principle is well beyond my scope. However, I do
have other reasons why I believe that policy proposals that incorporate the
balance concerned are attractive. And this is where the welfare and what I
call the communitarian arguments come in (Risse points out – correctly –
that I only consider a welfarist interpretation of communitarianism).
Essentially I argue that both the welfare of each individual, and the
welfare of others in the wider community, will be better served by these
policies than by alternative ways of providing services such as education
and health care – especially those that give professionals control over
the allocation of children to schools or patients to hospitals, effectively
reducing the users of these services to pawns. This is not because I believe
that the policies that turn pawns into queens do not have their problems
with respect to individual and communitywelfare; indeed, I refer to several
of these difﬁculties in the book. It is just that I consider them superior in
these respects to the alternatives. Risse does not buy all my arguments,
and I would accept some of his points (for instance, that we might place a
greater faith in the professionalsmaking decisions on behalf of users, if, as I
advocate elsewhere in the book,we could successfully line up knightly and
knavish incentives). But ultimately this is more of an empirical question
than a philosophical one, and we probably need more evidence of the
impact of different systems on welfare before we can arrive at a deﬁnitive
assessment.
To take up one speciﬁc point in this context. Discussing the proposal
that patients should have more control over their treatment, Risse argues
that “when it comes to resource distribution, each patient has an interest
in her health and thus is a poor judge of how to distribute resources
also needed by others.” I agree with this in so far it refers to choice of
treatment, and indeed use similar arguments elsewhere in the book to
justify GP fund-holding: the system where family practitioners hold the
budget for purchasing secondary care for their patients. But, so long as
there is available capacity in the relevant hospitals, it does not apply to
choice of hospital, once the diagnosis has been made and the appropriate
treatment speciﬁed; for in those circumstances one person’s choice does
not displace another’s. So the desirability of patient choice can depend on
the type of decision beingmade; and again a trade-off between patient and
professional power may be necessary in certain circumstances.
Finally, a speciﬁc point in a different context. Risse takes issuewithmy
argument for state intervention indecisions concerning savings for old age.
The argument is that state intervention to encourage savings is justiﬁed
even in a world of queens, because there is a form of market failure here:
that individuals have only a tenuous connection with their future selves
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and hence impose external costs on those future selves by their current
savings (or lack of savings) decisions. Risse’s argument against this is that
either it is rational for current individuals to neglect their future selves,
in which case the state should similarly neglect them, or it is not rational,
in which case the state would have no need to encourage savings over
and above that which rational individuals are doing already. Here Risse is
assuming that the state only has a responsibility to its current citizens. But
I think it is reasonable to assume that it also has a responsibility to other
people who suffer external costs as a by-product of the actions of those
citizens, including those who live in other states, and, of more relevance
to my argument, including those who live in the same state in the future.
The correction of external costs has always been seen as a proper role for
the state, and, in encouraging current individuals to save more and hence
beneﬁt future individuals, the state is legitimately exercising that role.
